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The Republic of the Philippines is a developing country with an agricultural base, light 
industry, and service-sector economy. It had been listed in "Next Eleven" economies. The 
Philippines had one of the most vibrant Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) industries in 
Asia. The Philippines telecommunication market was competitive with several mobile 
cellular services, international gateway providers and at least two operators to provide 
fixed line in each region across the country. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines, 
March 2007) 
 
Mobile telecom services had been the drive of growth, as in other developing countries. 
Philippines had been among the early Asian countries to launch 3G services. The 
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), the regulatory agency allocated 3G 
licenses in 2005.  
 
 
Source: www.lonelyplanet.com, March 2007 
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3G Services in Philippines 
 
In August 2005, the NTC issued the 3G guidelines for the operators. Nine companies - 
AZ Communications Networks, Inc. (AZCN), Bayan Telecommunications, Inc 
(BayanTel), Connectivity Unlimited Resources Enterprises Inc. (CURE), Digitel Mobile 
Philippines Inc. (Digitel), Globe Telecom Inc. (Globe), Multimedia Telephony Inc. 
(MTI), Next Mobile Inc. (Next Mobile), Pacific Wireless, Inc (Pacific) and Smart 
Communications Inc. (Smart) applied to the government for the same.  
 
In the context of the debate over a suitable allocation mechanism, specifically auctions 
versus administrative allocation, NTC adopted an administrative mechanism to determine 
the capabilities of the operators for selection for the five available bands. This process 
assumes significance, especially in relation to the experience of a large number of 
European regulators and operators where operators bid so high in auctions for 3G that the 
viability of their operations was in jeopardy.  
 
This paper details out the process adopted by NTC to allocate 3G licenses and the issues 
that arose as a consequence of it. This would have learning for policy makers and 
regulators.   
 
Philippine Telecommunication Sector 
 
The Philippines telecommunication sector is distinctive in a number of ways. First, it was 
among those countries of the world where telecommunication services had been 
historically provided by private operators. Second, there had been a focus on development 
that required mobile and international operators to install a specific number of fixed line. 
Third, as in many other under developed telecom sectors and developing countries, was 
the explosive growth of mobile, making it the first country where mobiles surpassed fixed 
lines.  (www.itu.int/itudoc/gs/promo/bdt/cast_int/79479.html, March 2007)
 
Philippines’ telecom infrastructure prior to reforms in 1993, as in many other Asian 
countries, was poor, characterized by very limited rural services and long waiting lists for 
service throughout the country. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) 
was the dominant service provider. More than 60 telephone companies operated on a 
limited scale within towns and cities in the country. There were limited telephone lines in 
the entire country, and there were hundreds of municipalities with no telephone services 
at all. PLDT had failed to provide services in much of the countryside, minimizing its 
investments in growth and expansion of services. Smaller telecom operators, in primarily 
rural parts of the country, lacked the capital to expand their networks and services. With a 
view to accelerating the developments in the sector, the government passed the Public 
Telecommunications Act of 1995. 
 
With greater competition, the rate of growth of mobiles accelerated dramatically and was 
72.1% from 1998 to 2003. In a ranking of Asian countries, the Philippines was placed 
fourth in terms of the compounded annual growth rate in fixed line density (next to China, 
India, and Indonesia) and third in mobile phone density, next to India and Indonesia. 
(worldbank.org/INTEAPINFRASTRUCT/Resources/8550841137106254308/Philippines.
pdf March 2007). Table 1 gives data on the subscribers per operator and Table 2 gives the 
structure of the subscribers per operator segment and their growth. Appendix 1 highlights 
the important service operators in the country.  
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The National Telecommunications Commission 
 
The NTC was the government agency that has both regulatory and quasi-judicial 
functions. NTC took over from the Board of Communications and the 
Telecommunications Control Bureau which were brought to an end, in 1997. NTC was 
the sole body that exercises jurisdiction over the supervision, adjudication and control 
over all telecommunications services throughout the country.  
Although independent, in so far as its regulatory and quasi-judicial functions were 
concerned, the NTC remained under the administrative supervision of the Department of 
Transportation and Communication as an attached agency. However, with respect to its 
quasi-judicial functions, NTC's decisions could be appealed to directly in the Supreme 
Court. Appendix 2 highlights the role, and functions of the NTC. 
Table 1: Number of Telephone Subscribers per Operator (2005) 
Operator Lines Market Share (%) 
 Installed  Subscribed  Installed  Subscribed 
BAYANTEL
* 443,910 227,057 6.79 6.74
BELL TELECOM
* 12,710 1,942 0.19 0.06
DIGITEL  634,345 410,661 9.70 12.20
ETPI/TTPI  91,446 15,915                1.40  0.47
INNOVE
* 1,507,197 329,908 23.05 9.80
PHILCOM  213,236 52,752 3.26 1.57
PLDT  236,561 46,202 3.62 1.37
PILTEL  2,926,515 2,043,816 44.76 60.70
PT&T  129,000 24,468 1.97 0.73
Other LECS  343,467 214,531 5.25 6.37
Total 6,538,387 3,367,252 100.00  100.00
Source: http://www.ntc.gov.ph/consumer-frame.html, March 2007 
  Note: * No report submitted for December 2005. 
 
Table 2: Telecom Industry Structure 
 












Services 2002 2003 2004  2005 
Local Exchange Carrier Services  74 73 73 73 
Inter-Carrier Carrier Service   14 14 14 14 
International Gateway Facility  11 11 11 11 
Radio Mobile    
Public Trunk Repeater Service  11 11 10 10 
Value Added Service    
With Networks    
Coastal  12 13 18 18 
Broadband  19 19 19 19 
Without Networks  186 249 292 351 
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Process of 3G License Allocation  
 
Step 1: First Memorandum Circular (Internal Document NTC) 
 
As part of the administrative process leading to the issuance of rules and regulations to 
govern the assignment of 3G licenses and frequencies, the NTC issued a draft 
Memorandum Circular (MC) on the subject in September 2004 and invited comments 
from all interested parties, particularly the telecommunications industry. NTC then 
conducted a public hearing on November 26, 2004
2. To improve “the process” and to 
address issues raised by several groups that it was premature at that juncture to allocate 
frequencies for 3G, NTC published Memorandum a Revised Draft Circulars and invited 
public comments. 
 
Step 2: Memorandum and Revised Draft MC on the Allocation and Assignment of 3G 
Licenses and Radio Frequency Bands in June 2005.  
 
The following is an edited excerpt from the document. 
 
Is the Market Ready for 3G? 
 
Subscribers and Revenue Base 
 
NTC noted that the experiences of countries with existing 3G services had shown 
considerable consumer demand for services with the launching of 3G networks. 
Data about the launch of the 3G services in different countries is given in 
Appendix 3. 
Costs of Handsets 
 
With respect to the concerns regarding 3G handset cost, available data showed 
that there were more than 150 3G handsets launched and on the market. 
According to US analyst Forward Concepts, mobile handsets addressing newer 
high-bandwidth technologies would grow sharply in 2005. EDGE cellular phones 
would grow by 51% to 60 million. While CDMA cellular phones would grow by 
165% to 45 million. With more than 25 3G device suppliers at present, growth 
was expected to be driven by competitive services, a wide variety of choice and 
maturing technology, which would ultimately drive the cost of 3G handsets lower 
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Lastly, the slow take up of service formats using the 2.5G and 2.75G technologies 
could be attributed to poor customer experience resulting from slow data 
transmission speed. Again, available data showed that with the advent of higher 
rates of data transmission made possible by the 3G technology, demand for 3G 
services had increased, thereby prompting 3G operators and content developers to 
keep pace. Data in a number of markets had shown increases in downloads and 
hence revenue. Appendix 4 highlights the same.   
 
2 At this time, NTC was still attached with the DOTC, it had felt the need to address the imbalance in the 
distribution of local exchange facilities and unsubscribed telephone lines following the implementation of 
making local exchange lines available.  
 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
NTC felt that under an appropriate regulatory framework for the encouragement of viable 
and efficient deployment, launch of 3G services could be made possible by the 
availability of technology necessary for mobile applications; the market demand would 
correspondingly increase to the benefit of the general public. 
 
The Prior Operator Rule 
 
“One of the contentions that are raised in the comments is that 3G is not a new service 
and may properly be classified as an enhancement of 2G mobile telecommunications 
technology. As 3G was a mere enhancement of 2G, it is contended that, should incumbent 
operators desire to construct and operate their own 3G networks, they should be allowed 
to simply apply for the assignment of frequencies as they have a prior legal right to the 
award of 3G licenses and frequencies as incumbent operators. It is likewise argued that 
the obligations imposed on existing Cellular Mobile Telecom Service (CMTS) operators, 
particularly the roll-out of at least 400,000 landlines for each CMTS operator, should 
likewise apply to prospective 3G operators.” 
 
NTC clarified that it viewed 3G as enhancement and improvement of the 2G technology. 
 
“A direct consequence of the categorization of 3G services as mere enhancements of the 
existing 2G technology would be the imposition on prospective 3G licensees of the same 
obligations, particularly the roll-out of at least 400,000 landlines for each CMTS operator. 
This finding did not necessarily mean that current CMTS operators have an exclusive 
right or are in the best position alone to be awarded with a license to provide, operate, and 
maintain 3G network services.” 
 
Since 3G was treated as an enhancement of the current 2, 2.5 and 2.75 CMTS 
technologies, a 3G licensee was to be subjected to the rollout requirement. However, the 
obligation imposed on the prospective awardees of a 3G license were not be as onerous or 
costly as to effectively detract service providers from engaging in this field.  
 
NTC also recognized its mandate of making telecom service accessible to unserved and 
underserved areas at affordable rates by efficient and effective use of spectrum by service 
providers to meet public demand. Consequently, NTC decided that the proposed 
allocation and award of 3G frequency bands would not be limited to existing CMTS 
franchise holders and licensees as envisioned by the incumbents nor could the prior 
operator rule be invoked to foreclose the participation of other telecommunications 
entities willing and sufficiently able to provide 3G services to the general public. 
 
Principle of Technology Neutrality and Improved Frequency Management 
 
“This assignment process precluded questions on technology neutrality as the 3G 
licensees are free to determine which type of platform (i.e., WCDMA, CDMA 2000, or 
TDD) is to be used for the operation of their respective 3G networks”. The NTC felt that 
prospective 3G license awardees should be given the freedom to choose which 3G 
platform to use in the operation of their respective 3G networks, so long as the 
frequencies capable of supporting the chosen 3G platform were available for assignment.  
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Under the earlier draft MC, five bands were to be allocated for the use of prospective 3G 
licensees. NTC noted, however, that such a process could result in a situation whereby a 
particular assignee failed to utilize the allocated frequency due to various reasons, 
foremost of which may be the financial incapacity to launch and operate a network. While 
it may be argued that licensees that failed to utilize their assigned frequencies 
nevertheless pay spectrum user’s fees, this proposition only led to inefficiency and waste 
in the utilization of what the law terms as a scarce public resource. 
 
In order to ensure that spectrum that was allocated was actually used (and not hoarded), a 
spectrum users fee had been specified in the first consultation paper: in order to 
strengthen the motivation for using the spectrum, the proposal was enhanced to include 
the assessment of the initiative of operators to launch the network and thereafter apply for 
the privilege of using the same. Moreover, the assignment of 3G frequencies would 
depend on a 3G licensee’s network requirements and capacity for expansion, thereby 
greatly reducing, if not entirely eliminating, the recurrence of the non-use of frequencies.  
 
Under the revised draft MC, NTC clarified that it was mandated to hold open tenders only 
where two or more 3G licensees desired to use a particular frequency for their respective 
3G networks, and there was only frequency available to support the platform chosen by 
both licensees. 
 
It also came out with a MC specifying the detailed rules and regulations of allocation and 
assignment of 3G radio frequency bands also dated June 10, 2005. There were a number 
of concerns regarding the proposed licensed conditions. To address these concerns; NTC 
came out with the revised MC dated August 7, 2005 on the allocation and assignment of 
3G licenses and radio frequency bands. The key issues that were specified in this revised 
circular are shown in Appendix 5. NTC published the revised memorandum circular 
detailing the rules and regulations for allocation and assignment of 3G radio frequency 
bands on August 7, 2005 
 
Step 3: Rules and Regulations on the Allocation and Assignment of 3G Radio 
Frequency Bands in its MC dated August 7, 2005. 
 
NTC ruled out an open tender for frequencies since these were to be granted to the best 
qualified service provider taking into account the latter’s proposal to utilize the spectrum 
efficiently and effectively meet public demand. The NTC framework provided for 
bidding where the demand for specific frequencies exceeded availability. “Instances 
where, following the screening of the applicants to determine which among them is the 
most qualified, there is a) a deadlock between two or more applicants in terms of 
qualification, and b) the number of applicants exceed the number of frequencies” 
Fee Structure 
 
During the public consultation on the draft MC, legality of collecting upfront payments as 
well as the establishment of minimum bid prices was discussed. 
 
Taking into consideration the need to ensure that prospective licensees immediately 
constructed and operated their respective networks, NTC believed that imposing upfront 
payments and minimum bid prices in the assignment of frequencies, at this time, would 
pose an additional burden which would severely tax the financial resources of the 
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licensees even before they could commence operations. Such a burden would be passed 
on to the consumers in the form of increased prices and higher rates. 
 
Allocation of Frequencies 
 
Under the attached revised draft rules, bandwidths were to be allocated and assigned 
depending on the prospective licensees’ need for frequencies. The fee structure proposed 
under the revised draft rules was meant to complement this policy. Thus, fees were to be 
imposed on a graduated scale based on the number of frequency bandwidths which were 
to be applied for and used by the 3G licensees. 
 
The allocation of radio frequency band, criteria, determination of qualified applicant, 
performance bond, spectrum user fees, obligations of the assignees, and process of 
selection of operators would remain the same as in the earlier draft; the payable fee 




NTC identified the following frequency bands for 3G 
 
  825 – 845MHz* 
  870 – 890MHz* 
1880 – 1900MHz 
1920 – 1980MHz 
2110 – 2170MHz 
2010 - 2025MHz 
 
(*These frequencies were currently assigned to existing CMTS operators) 
 
Criteria to be Used in the Selection of Qualified Public Telecommunications Entities 
 
In order to be selected as a qualified applicant for consideration of ranking, the applicants 
needed to satisfy the following conditions: 
 
1.  Be a holder of a valid Congressional franchises that included authorizations to 
install, operate, and maintain CMTS or 3G. 
 
2.   Existing authorized CMTS providers opting to upgrade their networks to 3G.  
 
    3.   An entity intending to operate a 3G mobile telecommunications system would have 
to file its application to NTC or acquire a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity (CPCN) to install, operate and maintain a 3G mobile telecommunications 
system to NTC not later than 30 days from the date of issue of MC dated August 7, 
2005.   
 
4.  Entities with applications for the assignment of the 3G radio frequency bands could 
form a consortium. The details of the consortium including the details of their 
ownership and control structure needed to be submitted for evaluation.  
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5.  For new public telecommunications entities, the minimum paid-up capital stock 
should be Philippine peso (Php) 100 million.  
 
6.  For existing duly authorized PTEs, debt to equity ratio should be 70:30 with total 
investments in the CMTS or 3G networks of at least Php 400 million already 
included in the calculation of the debt to equity ratio. 
 
7.  Entities needed to provide proof of their technical capability to install, operate and 
maintain the proposed CMTS or 3G networks. 
 
8.  Existing authorized PTEs had to provide proof that they had no outstanding unpaid 
supervision and regulations fees (SRF), spectrum user fees (SUF), radio station 
license fees, permit fees and other fees imposed by the NTC. 
 
In addition, applicants were required to provide a written undertaking to:  
 
•  Interconnect with all 3G networks, CMTS operators, local exchange networks and 
all other public networks pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations on 
mandatory interconnection.  
 
•  Allow the sharing of their network and facilities with other 3G players in areas 
where demand did not allow more than one 3G network. 
 
•  Negotiate roaming agreements with other 3G networks or existing duly authorized 
CMTS operators. 
 
•  Abide by the terms and conditions set by NTC in cases where its negotiations for 
interconnection, sharing of networks and facilities and/or roaming fail to reach 
agreements within 90 days from date of the start of negotiations for the same. 
 
•  Post bond equivalent to Php 300 million 
 
Applicants for the assignment of the 3G radio frequency bands would be ranked based 
on the track record, roll-out commitments and rates to be charged from the consumers.  
 
Spectrum Users Fees 
 
The annual spectrum user fees (SUF) for the allocated and assigned 3G radio frequency 
bands was set out as specified in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: SUF Charges 
 
Amount of Spectrum 
(MHz) 
Amount (per MHz)  
(Php in million) 




First 5 MHz  5  3 
Additional 1 MHz but not 
exceeding total 10 MHz 
8 6 
Additional 1 MHz but not 
exceeding total 15 MHz 
10 8 
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An additional SUF of Php 2 million would be imposed on each authorized 3G network 
operator for every 100,000 additional subscribers in excess of the first 4 million. 
  
Existing CMTS providers opting to upgrade their networks to 3G using their existing 
assigned radio frequencies, and qualified to do so, would pay annual SUF of Php 65 
million for the first 10MHz x 2 radio frequency band plus Php 8 million for each 
additional 1MHz x 2 of radio frequency in excess of the first 10MHz x 2.  
 
An additional SUF of Php 2 million would also be imposed for every 100,000 additional 
subscribers in excess of the first 4 million.  
 
The application would undergo quasi-judicial process which would be completed within 
60 days (from the date of the MC dated August 7, 2005). The criteria for evaluation 
would be based on: 
 
a. Proof of track record in the operation of mobile telecommunications systems 
particularly 3G networks. 
 
b.   A 5 year roll-out plan to cover at least 80% of the provincial capital towns/ 
cities and   80% of the chartered cities. 
 
c.  Schedule of rates for the different types of 3G services to be offered. The 
schedule of rates would be the maximum rates that could be charged within the 
first 24 months from start of commercial operations which should not be later 
than 30 months from date of award of the 3G radio frequency bands. Other 3G 
services not included in the submitted list could be offered subject to prior 




The ranking would be determined using a 10-point scoring system for each of the 
prescribed criteria. Ten points would be given to the company with the best proposal and 
0 points for the company that failed to comply with the prescribed criteria. The 
evaluation scheme for the criteria was as follows: 
Criterion 1 
Criterion 1 consisted of two sub criterion as listed below: 
Sub Criterion a 
Must submit proof of track record in the operation of mobile telcornmunications 
systems particularly 3G networks (3.6f of MC No. August 7, 2005). 
Track record was used as a criterion not only to ensure that the applicant once 
selected would be able to install the proposed 3G network but also to ensure that 
the applicant would be able to operate and maintain the same. Hence, the points to 
be given to applicants with previous authorization would be based on their 
compliance with the terms and conditions of their prior authorizations, particularly 
on the installation of their previously authorized networks. 
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Applicants with existing mobile telecommunications system authorization and that 
had fully complied with their commitments in terms of number of existing and 
operational cell sites or mobile base stations sites would get 7.0 points. 
Applicants with existing mobile telecommunications system authorization who 
had satisfactorily complied with their commitments in terms of number of existing 
and operational cell sites or mobile base stations sites would get 6.0 points. 
Zero point would be given to applicants that had failed to install cell sites or 
mobile base station sites or had not installed sufficient number of cell sites or 
mobile base station sites based on their approved roll-out plans. 
Applicants with authorizations to install, operate and maintain networks other than 
cellular mobile telecommunications networks would be rated on the basis of their 
compliance with their respective authorizations. Applicants that had fully 
complied with their respective authorizations would be given 5.0 points, while 
applicants that had satisfactorily complied with their respective authorizations 
would be given 4.0 points. Zero point would be given to applicants that had not 
installed any equipment. 
New company-applicants who had sufficiently demonstrated their ability to meet 
the criteria as set out in Sec. 3.3 of MC No. August 7, 2005 would be given 4.0 
points. 
Sub Criterion b 
Experience with 3G 
An additional 3.0 points would be given to applicants who had foreign company-
partners that were operating 3G networks. 
Applicants who had no foreign company-partners operating 3G networks but had 
commitments from 3G equipment vendor/ suppliers for the supply and installation 
of 3G networks on turnkey basis would be given 1.5 points. 
Zero point would be given to applicants with no foreign company-partner 3G-
network operator and with no commitments on turnkey basis from 3G equipment 
vendor/ supplier for the supply and installation of 3G networks. 
Criterion 2 
Must submit a 5 year rollout plan to cover at least 80% of the provincial 
cities/municipalities and 80% of chartered cities networks (3.6g of MC No. 
August 7, 2005). 
Applicants who submitted rollout plans covering only the minimum required 
coverage of 80% of provincial capital cities and municipalities and 80% of 
chartered cities would be given 7.0 points. 
Applicants who submitted roll-out plans over and above the minimum required 
coverage of 80% of provincial capital cities and municipalities and 80% of 
chartered cities would be given a maximum of 10.0 points and a minimum of 8.0 
points, depending on the number of cities and municipalities to be covered by the 
roll-out plans submitted. 
Applicants who submitted roll-out plans that did not meet the minimum coverage 
but had made a commitment to cover the minimum required coverage within the 
prescribed period of 5 years would be given a maximum of 5.0 points and a 
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minimum of 1.0 point, depending on the number of areas covered by the roll-out 
plans submitted; 
Zero point would be given to applicants who submitted roll-out plans that failed to 
comply with the minimum required coverage and had not submitted any 
commitment to comply with the minimum required coverage within the prescribed 
period. 
Criterion 3 
Must submit schedule of rates for the different types of 3G services to be offered. 
The schedule of rates shall be the maximum rates that can be charged within the 
first 24 months from start of commercial operations networks (3.6h of MC No. 
August 7, 2005) 
Retail rates of 3G services directly affected or benefited the consumers. In a fully 
competitive environment, retail prices tend to converge to the lowest retail prices 
in the market. Being market-driven, it was expected that retail prices of all 3G 
operators would converge to the retail prices of 3G operators with the lowest retail 
prices. Therefore, 10.0 points would be given to applicants who could submitted 
rate proposals deemed beneficial to consumers. 
The maximum total points that could be garnered for the foregoing criteria were 30.0. To 
be considered best qualified, an applicant needed to be compliant with the requirements/ 
undertakings specified and detailed in sections 3.6 a, b, c, d and e of MC No. August 7, 
2005 (Appendix 5) and must have got at least 2/3 of the maximum total points or 20.0 
points (3.6 f, g, and h of MC No. August 7, 2005).  
NTC rationalized that, “in the exercise of its discretion, and consistent with the dictates of 
the law that it grants authorization only to those that could satisfactorily comply with the 
terms and conditions set for such authorizations, deems it appropriate that a qualified 3G 
applicant must garner at least 2/3 of the total number of points to be allocated in the 
selection process.” 
Since NTC treated 3G as further enhancement 2G and its upgrades, authorized CMTS 
service providers were automatically qualified as applicants for the assignment. Any PTE 
had to first comply with the Circular’s requirements of attaining the status of a CMTS 
service provider before being further qualified for consideration as a 3G service provider. 
Entities other than those considered as existing CMTS providers were deemed new 
entrants. They would be required to file an application for a provisional authority or a 
certificate of CPCN and the same would qualify as an applicant for the issuance of a 3G 
frequency. 
Of the companies that applied, BayanTel, Digetel, MTI, Globe and Smart were 
considered as existing CMTS providers. AZNC, Next Mobile were considered as existing 
PTE and CURE was a new entrant. 
Step 4: Evaluation of Applicants 
NTC came out with a Consolidated Order dated December 29, 2005 that provided the 
evaluation of all applicants. 
a) Review of Applications 
 
 
In the review of applications, NTC realized that MTI had filed an application for a CPCN 
to install, operate and maintain a Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS 
or 3G) as early as June 8, 2000 and had submitted its formal offer of evidence as early as 
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November 9, 2003. This was despite the fact that, as of that time, NTC had yet to come 
out with the Circular that would allocate the 3G frequencies. However, it had been 
granted a provisional authority to install, operate and maintain a nationwide public mobile 
telephone service and to charge rates only last October 12, 2005 at the time when the 
Circular for 3G applications was already in effect. NTC ruled that MTI had to submit to 
the same process if it is, as of the present time, a duly authorized CMTS provider. 
MTI was qualified as an existing CMTS provider since it had allocation of CMTS 
frequencies in the 1800 MHz bandwidth for service provision called as Personal 
Communication Network. 
b) Evaluation Process 
The evaluation process consisted of the applicants submitting their application, receiving 
public comments on the applications, hearing the response of the applicant to the 
comments, and NTC’s decision on evaluation taking into account the various points 
raised in the process above.  
Individual Applicant Evaluation 
i)  AZ Communications Networks, Inc. (AZCN) 
The public comments against AZCN were as follows: 
1.    AZCN was only enfranchised to provide services and equipments to 
private   entities only and this did not qualify it as PTE. 
2.   No evidence had been provided to show that AZCN had no outstanding 
and/or unpaid SRF.  
3.    The application was not financially feasible nor was the applicant 
financially capable of undertaking the proposed project considering that it 
had a net operating loss amounting to Php 30 million in 2004 and Php 168 
million in 2003. Given the applicant’s precarious financial position, and 
the fact that it would depend on supplier’s credit from Lucent 
Technologies, it was highly doubtful that applicant could implement its 
roll out plan. 
4.    The transfer of the controlling interest in the applicant has not been 
approved by the Congress as required by its franchise. 
5.    The application was not technically feasible. The applicant would be 
unable to build up its network to implement its roll out plan in the absence 
of funding to support the undertaking. 
6.   The applicant had no track record of CMTS provision. 
AZCN’s Response 
1.      NTC had empowered AZCN to provide services to the general public. 
AZCN maintained that the track record contemplated under MC No. 
August 7, 2005 included the track record of its key personnel with relevant 
experience in the CMTS industry. 
  2.    With respect to the issue of its financial capability, applicant argued that 
its shareholders would increase the paid-up capital once it was granted the 
CPCN or provisional authority applied for.  
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3.     Lucent Technologies has agreed to provide products and services 
necessary to rollout and operate AZCN CDMA 2000 network. Lucent had 
indicated that third party financiers and foreign operators were interested 
in investing in its proposed service.  
4.    AZCN maintained that its financial position was as per the eligibility 
requirements. There were concerns regarding the response given by AZCN 
especially on the financial capability. There was no proof that the 
applicant’s debt to equity ratio and its ability to provide the necessary 
financing for maintaining the roll-out targets could be met. 
NTC’s Decision 
The NTC ruled that based on its franchise, AZCN was duly authorized to operate 
throughout the Philippines. Based on the technical evaluation, the applicant was 
qualified. However, the NTC found that the applicant’s rollout plan fell short of 
the required minimum coverage of 80% of provincial capital cities/ municipalities 
and 80% of the chartered cities. Appendix 6 highlights the five year roll out plan, 
the proposed nationwide network coverage along with the total number of cities 
and municipalities. 
Moreover, while AZCN was legally qualified and the proposed 3G project was 
technically feasible, AZCN did not have the financial capability to undertake 3G 
operations and to raise the Php 400 million initial paid stockholder’s equity. This 
was a mandatory requirement and thus application of the AZCN for 3G services 
was denied. 
ii) Connectivity Unlimited Resource Enterprise, Inc., (CURE) 
CURE was not an existing service provider. It asserted that it would position itself 
as a ‘pure’ 3G operator from launch.  
Public concerns regarding CURE were as follows: 
1.   CURE’s lack of financial and managerial capability for 3G, the absence of 
NTC’s frequency allocation and lack of public demand for 3G would 
cause problems. CURE was not financially capable because its equity 
(authorized capital Php 1.2 million, and paid-up of Php 7.5 million) was 
insufficient for a needed $1 billion 3G rollout nationwide. CURE would 
face significant challenges to develop real revenue streams from 3G 
services from exorbitant costs of licenses that had already placed many 
firms in extreme debt, and from the decline in voice revenues and over-
hyped publicity already surrounding wireless Internet, as had been the 
experience of mobile operators worldwide. 
2.   CURE did not have the technical capability, managerial and operational 
experience, and adequate and qualified personnel complement to use a 
modern and complicated technology in order to provide the so-called killer 
applications.  
CURE’s Response  
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NTC’s Decision 
Based on the technical documents, the proposed 3G network appeared to be 
technically feasible. Although CURE’s roll out plan failed to comply with the 
80% coverage requirement under the 3G rules and regulations (Appendix 7), in a 
subsequent application, the applicant committed to cover 95% of the provincial 
cities and municipalities and 90% of chartered cities. Subsequently, the applicant 
had also complied with the minimum required paid up capital for new companies.   
On these conditions, CURE’s application for a CPCN was granted provisional 
authority to install, operate and maintain a mobile telecommunications system. 
iii)  Next Mobile, Inc. 
The public concerns regarding Next Mobile were as follows: 
1.  Since several carriers were operating CMTS, there was cramped 
competition of CMTS subscribers among existing operators. The operation 
by Next Mobile of the proposed service constituted a wasteful duplication 
of existing telecommunications service. 
2.  The applicant had not proven its technical and financial capacity to carry 
out its undertaking. 
3.  The applicant had a sorry track record as a telecommunications company 
with only 36,000 subscribers and 139 base stations.  
4.  Its operations had been plagued by the withdrawal of its foreign partner, 
violation of several laws, cash flow problems, and lack of experience in 
CMTS and/or 3G technology. 
5.  Given its dire financial and operational conditions, the applicant would not 
be able to meet the prescribed funding requirement. It had a deficit 
amounting to Php11.5 billion as of December 31, 2004 and was therefore 
not capable of embarking and sustaining 3G. 
6.  Applicant’s franchise limited its authority to provide radio communication 




1.    NTC ruled that Next Mobile was authorized to provide 
telecommunications services and had the “legal personality” to apply for a 
license based on the legislative franchise and by its Amended Articles of 
Incorporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission which 
expressly stated that the main purposes for which the corporation was 
formed included all telecom services. 
 
2.   Evaluation of the Technical Proposal 
 
On the technical side, Next Mobile had:  
 
a.   Existing system that were classified as 2.5 G technology as it is capable of 
producing mobile data services at speeds comparable to GSM (GPRS). 
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b. A network of 139 base stations covering Metro Manila and Southern Luzon 
from Pampanga to Batangas as well as Baguio. 
c. Increased its cell sites beginning with Cebu and Davao. 
 
Based on the technical documents submitted by Next Mobile, the proposed 3G 
network appeared to be technically feasible. Next Mobile committed to cover 90% 
of the provincial capital towns/cities and 85% of chartered cities with initial 
coverage to be achieved through the deployment of 355 cell sites in 135 areas. 
The applicant was found to be financially viable. In view of the foregoing, NMI 
was considered for allocation of 3G license. 
 
iv)  Pacific Wireless, Inc.,  
Public concerns regarding Pacific were: 
1.    Pacific’s  financial  capability  to  undertake the proposed project on the 
grounds that it had only projected assets of Php 34.92 billion whereas the 
total network and non-network capitalization requirement for the project as 
testified to by Pacific financial witness was Php 37.57 billion. The word 
“projected” implied that the applicant had no actual assets of the amount 
indicated. Pacific did not prove the technical feasibility of the application 
as it failed to provide for Visayas and Mindanao, traffic forecast for data, 
and, coverage map and plot. 
2.    Pacific legal personality was in doubt since the corporate entities holding 
almost 99% of the capital stock of Pacific were non-existent or not owned 
by Filipinos. Pacific failed to supply sufficient documentary proofs that 
could guide NTC in properly inquiring into whether or not Pacific 
shareholding was in compliance with the nationality requirement in 
accordance with Constitution. 
3.    The capital infusion of stockholders was predicated upon the applicant’s 
acquisition of a license from the NTC. By itself, Pacific was not 
technically capable of undertaking the project.  
4.   The 1995 Household population data utilized by Pacific as base figures for 
its market projections were antiquated figures resulting in an inaccurate 
demographic base for Pacific market niche. 
NTC’s Decision 
Based on the technical documents, the proposed 3G network appeared to be 
technically feasible and its roll-out plan covering 90% of the cities and 80% of the 
municipalities within the five year roll-out period was in compliance with the 
minimum requirements. 
In the absence of adequate proof, Pacific’s shareholding was deemed to be in 
compliance with the nationality requirement of the Constitution. 
While the technical evaluation showed that the proposed network of Pacific was 
legally qualified and the proposed 3G project was technically feasible, it had 
failed to comply with the financial capability requirement (Sec. 3.3c of MC No. 
August 7, 2005).  As a duly licensed PTE, Pacific was expected to have built up 
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the financial capability to undertake 3G operations and to raise the Php 400 
million initial paid stockholders’ equity.   
On legal and financial grounds, Pacific application for a CPCN to construct, 
establish, install, operate and maintain a nationwide 3G mobile 
telecommunications system was denied. 
c)  Ranking Criteria 
Based on the foregoing, the applicants for a 3G authorization were evaluated as 
follows: 
i)  Bayantel Telecom, Inc.,  
BayanTel had no unpaid fees and has submitted the required undertakings for 
interconnection, network and facilities sharing, roaming and submission to 
Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1.   Bayantel was given a total of 1.5 points for track record since: 
i.    It was non-compliant with its commitments under its previous 
authority as it had an existing CMTS authorization but had failed to 
put up an operational network, for which reason it was given 0 
point. 
ii.   It had submitted a supply and engineering turnkey agreement with 
a 3G equipment supplier, ZTE Corp., for which it was given 1.5 
points. 
2.  It was given 7.0 points for its roll-out plan, which proposed to cover 82% 
of provincial capital cities/ municipalities and 87% of chartered cities. 
3.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
Thus, Bayantel got a total of 18.5 points. 
ii)  Communication Unlimited Resources Enterprise, Inc. 
Being a new public telecommunications entity, CURE had no unpaid fees. It had 
submitted the required undertakings for interconnection, network and facilities 
sharing, roaming and submission to Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1.  It was given 4.0 points as a new public telecommunications entity that had 
sufficiently demonstrated its ability to meet the financial criteria as set out 
in Sec. 3.3 of MC No. August 7, 2005. 
2.  It had a turnkey agreement with 3G equipment suppliers, Nokia, Alcatel 
and Nortel, for the supply and installation of its proposed 3G network, for 
which it was given 1.5 points. 
3.  It was given 5.0 points for its rollout plan. The initial CURE roll-out plan 
did not meet the minimum coverage of at least 80% of the provincial 
capital cities/municipalities and 80% of chartered cities, as the same was 
submitted prior to the promulgation of MC August 7, 2005, but the 
company subsequently submitted a written commitment dated October 27, 
2005 to cover 95% of the provincial capital cities and municipalities and 
90% of the chartered cities within 48 months from date of assignment of 
3G allocated frequencies. 
4.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
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Thus, CURE got a total of 20.0 points. 
 
iii) Digitel Mobile Philippines, Inc 
Digitel had no unpaid fees and had submitted the required undertakings for 
interconnection, network and facilities sharing, roaming and submission to 
Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1.  It was given a total of 9.0 points for track record since: 
  i.    It was an existing CMTS provider which had satisfactorily 
complied with its commitments under its previous authority for 
which it was given 6.0 points. 
  ii.   It had submitted a joint venture agreement with a foreign company 
3G operator, TELIA of Sweden, for which it was given 3.0 points. 
2.  It was given 8.0 points for its roll-out plan, which proposed to cover 90% 
of provincial capital cities/ municipalities and 100% of chartered cities. 
3.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
Thus, Digitel got a total of 27.0 points. 
iv)  Globe Telecom Inc., 
 
Globe had no unpaid fees and had submitted the required undertakings for 
interconnection, network and facilities sharing, roaming and submission to 
Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1. It was given 10.0 points for track record since: 
i.   It was an existing CMTS provider which had fully complied with 
its commitments under its previous authority, for which it was 
given 7.0 points. 
ii.   It has submitted a joint venture agreement with a foreign company 
3G operator, Singtel, which was a major shareholder in the 
company, for which it was given 3.0 points. 
2.  It was given 8.0 points for its roll-out plan, which proposed to cover 80% 
of provincial capital cities/ municipalities and 95% of chartered cities. 
3.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
Thus, Globe got a total of 28.0 points. 
v)  Multimedia Telephony Inc.,  
It had no unpaid fees and has submitted the required undertakings for 
interconnection, network and facilities sharing, roaming and submission to 
Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1.  It was given 5.5 points for track record since: 
i.   It was a non-CMTS public telecommunications entity which had 
satisfactorily complied with its commitments under its previous 
authority, for which it was given 4.0 points. 
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ii.    It had a turnkey supply and installation agreement with 3G 
equipment suppliers NEC, Nera and Nokia, for which it was given 
1.5 points. 
2.  It was given 3.0 points for its rollout plan. The MTI rollout plan 
envisioned 2% coverage within two years but the company had made a 
commitment to meet the minimum required coverage within the prescribed 
period of 5 years. 
3.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
Thus, MTI got a total of 18.5 points. 
vi)  Next Mobile Inc,  
On a subsequent assessment of 2004 audited financial statement of Next Mobile, 
NTC found that its submission was inconsistent with the figures appearing in the 
annual reports for 2003 and 2004, previously submitted by Next Mobile to the 
NTC.  
Next Mobile had unpaid SRF amounting to Php 126 million and unpaid SUF 
amounting to Php 9 million as of December 2005. Therefore, for purposes of its 
application for assignment of 3G frequency, Next Mobile was non-compliant with 
the requirement under Sec. 3.6a of MC No. August 7, 2005.  
Even if Next Mobile was to be accorded a 1-2 month restructured payment 
scheme consistent with present practice, the NTC noted that the staggered 
payment of SRF and SUF meant that Next Mobile would not be able to apply for 
assignment of 3G frequencies. In view of the foregoing, the NTC found that Next 
Mobile was not qualified for the allocation of 3G frequency and would no longer 
be considered for purposes of ranking the best-qualified applicants. 
Smart Communications Inc.,  
Smart had no unpaid fees and had submitted the required undertakings for 
interconnection, network and facilities sharing, roaming and submission to 
Commission’s intervention (interconnection). 
1.  It was given 10.0 points for track record since 
i.   It was an existing CMTS provider which had fully complied with 
its commitments under its previous authority, for which reason it 
was given 7.0 points. 
ii.   It had submitted a joint venture agreement with a foreign company 
3G operator, NTT DoCoMo, for which it had got 3.0 points. 
2.  It was given 10.0 points for its roll-out plan which proposes to cover 100% 
of provincial capital cities/ municipalities, 82% of chartered cities and 
1,482 additional cities and municipalities (92%). 
3.  It was given 10.0 points for its proposed service rates. 
Thus, Smart got a total of 30.0 points. 
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Table 4: Ranking by NTC  
 
Criteria Bayantel  Digitel  Globe  Smart  CURE  MTI 
1.Track 
Record 
1.5 9.0 10.0 10.0 5.5  5.5
2. Roll-out 
Plan 
7.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 5.0  3.0
3. Service 
Rates 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0  10.0
Total  18.5 28.0 29.0 30.0 20.5  18.5
















Based on this assessment, CURE, Digitel, Globe, and Smart were found as qualified for 
3G licenses as they all had secured more than 20 marks. Thus, while five bands were 
available, only four bidders qualified and awarded licenses. 
Subsequent Developments 
Motion of Consideration 
Subsequent to the award of licenses, BayanTel made the following motion for 
reconsideration (Source:  Internal Company Documents)
 *
1. “Bayantel is entitled to at least 5 points for track record because of its compliance with 
the terms and conditions of its previous authorizations as well as its proven capability 
of building, operating and maintaining a massive network infrastructure that is 3G 
compliant. 
2.  Bayantel’s track record should be evaluated based on its ability to freely comply with 
the terms and conditions of its previous authorizations and not based on those where it 
was legally prevented from complying with its obligations. 
      An injunction issued by the Court of Appeals which was lifted with finality by the 
Supreme Court on August 5, 2002, prevented it from fulfilling its requirement. 
Subsequently, its creditors filed a Petition for the Corporate Rehabilitation of 
Bayantel.”  
3.  Bayantel wanted NTC to consider the roll-out of its WLL CDMA network as proof of 
its capability to use the 3G spectrum efficiently and effectively under new and cost 
effective technologies. It also claimed to be the first telecommunication company that 
was able to comply with its roll-out obligations under the Service Area Scheme 
(SAS).  
 4. Bayantel was entitled to an additional 1.0 point for submitting a roll-out plan that was 
over and above the required minimum coverage”. 
                                                 
 
 
* Excerpted from internal company documents. 
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Details of the submission made by Bayantel are given in Appendix 8. 
Review by the Joint House Panel of the Congress 
Subsequent to the award of licenses, there were demands by the Joint House Panel of the 
Congress overseeing state information-technology policies requesting the NTC to nullify 
the 3G licenses. 
This was because as per their interpretation, the law required public bidding where 
demand for specific radio frequency exceeded availability. The NTC had awarded the 3G 
concessions without conducting an open tender or auction which was a clear violation of 
law. As a consequence, the government had also lost Php 15-25 billion.  
 
The panel claimed that Globe, Smart, Digitel, and CURE acquired licenses from the NTC 
free of charge because the agency said it did not have the power to impose taxes. On the 
other hand, the government stood to earn only approximately Php 700 million a year from 
the combined “frequency users fees” it would charge the three leading telecom firms in 
the country. 
 
The Joint House Panel suggested that the NTC could have collected “franchise fees”, not 
taxes, instead of giving away the licenses for free. The companies operating 3G also stood 
to gain but way of tax breaks, duty free import of equipment. 
 
However, the operators had a different view. “If auction had been pushed through, 
supposing already that applicants were willing to bet on an already exorbitant and 
unrealistic tripling of the minimum bid at Php 1.2 million for each band, than total 
proceeds could only run to Php 6.5 billion. Then the Php 15-25 billion windfall suggested 
by some members of Congress in several and memoranda is purely speculative and 
without solid substantiation”, Globe said 
 
The NTC had ordered the telcos concerned - Globe, Smart, Digitel, and CURE to submit 
their comments to the Congressional Resolution within 10 days from receipt of the order. 
Due to the political situation in Philippines, in which general elections are expected in 
May 2007, the NTC and policy makers were awaiting the political outcomes before 





•  The visibility of the telecom sector and the prior experience of 3G licensing in 
Europe and UK have shaped the perspectives of regulators and policy makers 
in identifying appropriate mechanisms for allocation. Since European bids 
through auctions had gone extremely high, most regulators in Asian countries 
were wary of an auction mechanism. Similar views had been expressed in 
India and Sri Lanka.  
However, this perspective needs to be analyzed as traditionally auctions are 
considered as the best mechanism to allocate scarce resources to entities that 
value it most. In a pure administrative mechanism as adopted by NTC, the 
price per MHz was fixed before the applications were sought. Since these was 
not determined by any market mechanism, there were contentions regarding 
the level of price.  
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Post 2000, some analysts have linked the problems with the European telecom 
firms to the high prices paid by them in 3G licenses. This has been sometimes 
interpreted to indicate that auctions are an inappropriate mechanism to allocate 
spectrum as bidders bid so high so as to make their operations unviable. 
However, this is not the right perspective. Bidders had voluntarily bid high 
and if their operations were subsequently hurt, it was a bad business decision, 
for which they need to “pay”. Operators had the option of choosing the level 
of bids, investing in alternative business, or opting out of bids to possibly buy 
the winners later. 
 
Poor performance in the telecom sector was not limited just to companies that 
had “overbid”, but was spread across companies in the US and those that had 
not bid.  
 
In developing countries, it is considered that possibly high auctions prices will 
lead to higher consumer prices and hence lower penetration. However, given 
enough competition and falling prices of technology will ensure that prices 
will come down, as had happened in India. Thus, governments need not be 
wary of this mechanism and choose less efficient methods of allocation. 
 
•  While auctions work best at allocating resources most efficiently to those who 
value it most, operational difficulties (awarding licenses to those who may not 
be technically competent and then stay away from roll out) has made 
regulators in Asian countries averse to auctions. However, from the point of 
view of the best way to allocate scarce public resources to private entities, 
auctions are appropriate. Auction design requires a great deal of thought and 
detailed design for them to be successful. Simultaneous Multiple Round 
auctions in the PCS band (A, B, D, E bands) designed by the FCC in the USA 
were considered successful. Operators do not usually opt for auctions as they 
feel they will have to pay a price that will reduce their profits; regulators need 
to take a view on the allocation mechanism.  
  
•  While incumbents in many Asian countries have argued that 3G services were 
extensions of 2G, only existing operators should be given 3G licenses. NTC 
maintained that while it considered 3G to be an extension of 2G, its mandate 
of promoting competition, gave it scope to introduce new players. This 
decision made the entry more competitive. 
 
•  The process adopted by NTC was efficient, as licenses were awarded within 
the specified time frame. There had been no legal review and operators had 
started working on the roll out plans. However, there was a long prior period, 
where operators were reluctant to consider offering 3G services.  
  
•  Since the process to be adopted for allocation did not undergo a review, there 
were concerns raised subsequently. While it does not seem likely that the 
allotted licenses will be revoked, the review by the Joint House Panel had 
created uncertainty in the sector. The NTC had taken the view that bidding 
would need to be resorted to only if there was more than one contender for the 
same frequency band. This is a contentious interpretation as there were nine 
bidders for five bands.  
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The Philippines “beauty contest” could have been more transparent if the NTC 
had also chosen license amounts as bid criteria. In the current model, the 
evaluation process could be considered as subjective, especially when the 
evaluation scores are combined across different criteria.  
 
•  While the criteria for evaluation was publicly discussed through the various 
circulars, the assessment criteria was disclosed only in the Consolidated 
Decision. Further, the cut off requirement of having to score at least 20 points 
out of a total of 30 was evolved by the NTC at the time of assessment of 
bidders. The NTC justified this as the discretion it rightly had. 
 
In a similar bidding process, that was adopted for private involvement in 
modernization of airports in India, the Request for Proposal (RFP) clearly 
stated that for the bidders to qualify  they had to score at least 80 marks on 
each dimension of Management and Technical Capability. The RFP also 
stated the total marks for each dimension, which was not the case in the NTC 
assessment. More elaboration from the NTC would have led to clearer 
outcomes. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Bayantel subsequent to the 
Consolidated Order highlights the uncertainty that could arise due to such non-
transparency.  
 
•  The adoption of a process by which the operators could choose the frequency 
band from amongst the available bands, gave freedom to the operators to 




•  The evaluation criteria on rates to be charged was not discriminating enough, 
as all applicants got a maximum score of 10.0 points. While designing 
evaluation criteria, it is important to arrive at a set of attributes that is powerful 




The commercial potential of wireless applications has brought spectrum policies to the 
forefront of regulatory arena. The case study highlights the influence of global 
developments (European 3G auctions) on domestic spectrum allocation processes.  
 
Policy makers need to understand that it is important to incorporate economic principles 
in spectrum allocation design. NTC chose a more conservative and economically less 
efficient approach by adopting beauty contest. Evaluation criteria needs to be very 
carefully designed and communicated to the bidders prior to the event. Although an open 
consultative approach in the early stages may appear to delay the process, in the long run, 







  Page No. 23  W.P.  No.  2007-10-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
References 
 
Alonzo, R.P. and Pedro, W.R. (1996) “The Philippine Telecommunications Industry”, 
Development Research News, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Philippines.  
 
ITU (2002) “Pinoy Internet: Philippines Case Study”, ITU, Geneva, Switzerland. 
 
Llanto, G.M. (2006) “Reviewing the Philippines’ spectrum management policy”, Policy 
Notes, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Philippines.  
 
National Telecommunications Commission (2005) “Memorandum Circular-Rules and 
Regulation on the Allocation and Assignment of 3G Radio Frequency Bands”, June 10, 
2005.  
 
National Telecommunications Commission (2005) “Memorandum and Revised Draft 
Memorandum Circular on the Allocation and Assignment of 3G Licenses and Radio 
Frequency Bands”, June 10, 2005. 
 
National Telecommunications Commission (2005) “Rules and Regulation on the 
Allocation and Assignment of 3G Radio Frequency Bands”, August 7, 2005. 
 
National Telecommunications Commission (2005) “Consolidated Order”, December 29, 
2005. 
 
National Telecommunications Commission (2005) “Motion of Consideration”, January 6, 
2006. 
 
Medalla, F. (2004) “Policy Coordination, Planning, and Infrastructure Provision in the 
Philippines”, Paper Commissioned for the ADB-JBIC World Bank East Asia and Pacific 
Infrastructure Flagship Study, 
  
Patalinghug, E.E. & Llanto, G.M. (2004) “Competition Policy and Regulation in Power 
and Telecommunications”, Discussion Paper Series No. 2005-18, Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, Philippines. 
 
Serafica, R.B. (2001) “Competition in Philippine Telecommunications: A Survey of the 
Critical Issues”, Policy Notes, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Philippines. 
 
Ure, J. (2004) “Infrastructure in East Asia and the Pacific–The Way Forward Telecom 
Note” Telecommunications Research Project, University of Hong Kong, for the World 
















Page No. 24  W.P.  No.  2007-10-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
Appendix 1: Major Telecom Operators in Philippines (Excepted from the website of 
the operators) 
Bayantel Telecommunications (www.bayantel.com.ph)  
Bayantel Holdings Corporation was incorporated in October 15, 1993. The service areas 
of the company included Metro Manila and Bicol and local exchange service areas in the 
Visayas and Mindanao regions combined cover a population of over 25 million, nearly 
33% of the population of the Philippines 
Bayantel was 85.4% owned by the Lopez Group and Benpres, a publicly-listed holding 
company owning the Lopez Group’s investments in communications, power, 
infrastructure and real estate, among others. The other main shareholder is the AIF.  
BayanTel recently reported continued growth from its business in the first quarter of 2005 
after reporting a significant growth in overall performance in 2004. Net revenues were 
7% higher at Php1.4 billion compared to Php1.3 billion last year. EBITDA was Php 592 
million, representing a 15% growth from the Php 514 million posted during the same 
period in 2004. 
Digitel Telecommunications Phils. Inc. (www.digitel.ph) 
Established in 1987, Digitel Telecommunications Phils. Inc. was majority-owned by JG 
Summit Holdings Inc., one of the largest and most diversified conglomerates in the 
Philippines. Digitel was the second largest provider of fixed line and the third largest 
mobile operator company in the country.  
In 2004, BayanTel reported a 58% growth in EBITDA at Php 2.23 billion compared to 
Php 1.43 billion in 2003. Net revenues also grew by 8% at Php 5.46 billion in 2004 
compared to about Php 5 billion in the previous year. 
 
Globe Telecom (www.globe.com.ph) 
 
Globe had a long history of connect the people through the strong links of communication 
throughout the country and the world. Globe Telecom descended directly from 
Dollaradio, a ship-to-shore radio and telegraph company in the 1920s which was later 
renamed Globe Wireless Limited (GWL). 
 
Net service revenue of the company has increased from Php 52,741 million in 2004 to 
Php 54, 897 million within a year. For the same period, EBITDA has declined from Php 
32,895 million to Php 31, 972 million. 
 
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) (www.pldt.com.ph) 
 
Founded on November 28, 1928, PLDT was the leading telecommunications provider in 
the PLDT offered fixed line, wireless, and information and communication technology, 
through extensive fiber optic backbone and fixed line, cellular and satellite networks.  
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For the financial year 2006, company showed the EBITD of Php 79.6 billion (up by 3% 
as compared to last financial year). Service revenue had also shown the same growth 
percentage (Php 125.1 billion for the year 2006 and Php 121.1 billion for 2005). The 
PLDT’s total cellular subscriber base for the year grew by 1.2 million to 20.4 million. 
 
Fixed line service revenues improved to Php 49.7 billion in 2005 from Php 48.5 billion 
last year due to a significant increase in data revenues which more than offset the declines 
in local exchange, NLD and ILD revenues. 
 
Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) (www.smart.com.ph) 
 
A wholly owned subsidiary of the country’s dominant telecommunications carrier, PLDT, 
Smart operated a nationwide mobile network and a satellite phone service. It had the most 
extensive and modern digital communications GSM network and infrastructure in the 
country, covering over 99 percent of the population. Smart was the Philippines' leading 
wireless services provider with 22.9 million subscribers on its GSM network as of end-
September 2006, equivalent to approximately 58% market share. And by the end of 
February 2007, it had 25 million subscribers.   
 
In 2006, Smart added about 1.2 million subscribers in 4Q 2006 resulting in a total 
combined subscriber base of about 24.2 million as of year ending 2006. Service revenue 
grew by 5% i.e. to Php 78.4 billion. Company’s EBITDA had also increased with the 
same percentage (5%) to Php 50.3 billion. 
 
Appendix 2: Roles and Responsibilities of NTC 
 
For the effective enforcement of this liability, it takes on and publicizes such guidelines, 
rules, and regulations relative to the establishment operation and maintenance of various 
telecommunication facilities and services nationwide.  
 
The NTC believes that it is in competitive world, communications industry will achieve a 
formidable status. The five key goals inspire, as it move towards a competitive 
environment 
 
•  To establish a better, pro-competitive interconnection standards for 
telecommunications technologies; 
•  To deregulate communications services, that ensure fair rules of competition, 
where consumers can choose the best combination of price, service and quality 
for their needs 
•  To protect consumers, to make sure that their interest is not compromised, as the 
sector  move towards a competitive marketplace and encourage wider entry 
•  To promote efficient use of the electromagnetic spectrum to develop products that 
consumers want, and 
•  To catch up with the world leaders in telecommunications in terms of regulation 
and reform by following the standards set by advanced nations for promoting 
open and competitive markets. 
 
NTC has 14 Regional Offices nationwide which are under the direct control of the Office 
of NTCer. Functions of NTC are, to supervision and control over all telecommunications 
and broadcast services/ facilities of the country.  
 
  Page No. 26  W.P.  No.  2007-10-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
Appendix 3: 3G Services Around the World 
 
To date, 134 3G licenses have been awarded across 48 countries to operators that will 
deploy 3G services, with 67 networks having launched commercial services. As of 
November 2004, Vodafone has launched 3G services in 13 different markets around the 
world. 3G has been launched in Australia (by Hutchison in April 2003), Hong Kong (by 
Hutchison in January 2004, and by Hong Kong CSL and SmarTone in December 2004), 
Japan (in October 2001 and December 2002), Korea (by KTF and SKT in December 
2003), Singapore (by SinGTIel Mobile in December 2004 and Starhub in April 2005), 
and Malaysia (by Maxis Mobile in April 2005). Planned launches across Asia include 
those in Australia (by Optus, Vodafone and Telstra), Hong Kong (by Sunday), Indonesia 
(by Natrindo Telepon Selular), Malaysia (by Telekom Malaysia), New Zealand (by 
TelstraClear and Vodafone), Singapore (by M1), and Thailand (by TOT). 
 
Worldwide, the total number of 3G subscribers has reached 22 million, a 500% market 
growth during 2004 alone, with the Asia-Pacific region showing the strongest growth. 
Telecommunications market analyst EMC estimates that by December 2009, there will be 
more than 325 million 3G subscribers. Hutchison’s total 3G customer base, currently 
standing at over 80 million worldwide, saw a 70 million growth in 2004. In Japan, NTT 
DoCoMo achieved the ten millionth 3G customer in February 2005. 
 
Appendix 4: Number of Subscribers and Growth of Revenue in 3G  
 
In the United Kingdom, Hutchison 3G reported more than ten million music video 
downloads in the last six months of 2004. Along the same lines, Vodafone has launched a 
catalogue of 500,000 full-length music tracks as part of its live 3G offering in Europe. 
The said company has likewise launched customer service contact by video calls. In Hong 
Kong, CSL and Real Netwoks have announced the availability of Asia’s first mobile 
media service, enabling customers to watch on-demand video while transparently 
switching between CSL’s GPRS (2.5G), EDGE (2.75G) and the new UMTS (3G) data 
networks. MediaCorp Studios and the Media Development Authority (MDA) of 
Singapore have announced Asia’s first 3G mobi-dramas via media streaming. The thirty-
episode Chinese mobi-drama is slated to make its debut in Singapore in mid-June 2005. 
In South Africa, Vodacom has launched 3G with global and local content including 
picture messaging, games, polyphonic ringtones, 3D Java games as well as video 
messaging, video phone calls and music downloads.  
 
Appendix 5: Revised Memorandum Circular dated August 7, 2005  
 
Rules and regulations on the allocation and assignment of 3G radio frequency bands 
 
Allocation of radio frequency bands for international mobile telecommunications 
2000 (IMT 2000) or third generation mobile telecommunications. 
 
The following radio frequency bands as identified by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) are hereby re-allocated for the use of international 
mobile telecommunications (IMT2000) or 3G mobile telecommunications in the 
Philippines and shall form part of the National Radio Frequency Allocation Table 
(NRFAT), namely: 
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  825 – 845MHz* 
  870 – 890MHz* 
1880 – 1900MHz 
1920 – 1980MHz 
2110 – 2170MHz 
2010 -2025MHz 
 
The above-allocated frequency bands shall be made available for assignment to not more 
than 5 qualified public telecommunications entities (PTE). 
 
*These frequencies are currently assigned to existing CMTS operators. 
 
Criteria to be used in the selection of qualified public telecommunications entities 
 
Only entities with authorizations to install, operate and maintain cellular mobile 
telecommunications system (CMTS) or 3G shall be accepted as applicants for the 
assignment of herein allocated 3G radio frequency bands. 
 
Existing duly authorized cellular mobile telephone service providers opting to upgrade 
their networks to 3G shall qualify as applicants for the assignment of 3G frequencies 
subject to the provisions of the applicable Sections hereof, more particularly, Section 3.6 
and Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
 
An entity intending to operate a 3G mobile telecommunications system shall file its 
application for authority or certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) to 
install, operate and maintain a 3G mobile telecommunications system to the Commission 
not later than thirty (30) calendar days from the effectivity of this Circular. The applicant 
shall possess the following minimum qualifications: 
 
a. Holder of a valid Congressional franchise; 
 
b. For new public telecommunications entities, the minimum paid-up capital stock 
shall be   Php100 million; 
 
c. For existing duly authorized PTEs, debt to equity ratio shall be 70:30 with total 
investments in the CMTS or 3G networks of at least Php400 million already 
included in the calculation of the debt to equity ratio; and 
 
d. Must prove that it has the technical capability to install, operate and maintain 
the proposed CMTS or 3G networks. 
 
The application shall undergo quasi-judicial process. The process shall be completed 
within 60 calendar days from date of the affectivity of this Circular. 
 
For existing authorized PTEs, no outstanding unpaid supervision and regulations fees 
(SRF), spectrum user fees (SUF), radio station license fees, permit fees and other fees 
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Must submit a written undertaking that it shall interconnect with all 3G networks, cellular 
mobile telephone networks, local exchange networks and all other public networks 
pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations on mandatory interconnection. 
 
Must submit a written undertaking that is shall allow the sharing of its network and 
facilities with other 3G players in areas where demand does not allow more than 1 3G 
network. 
 
Must submit written undertaking that it shall negotiate roaming agreements with other 3G 
networks or existing duly authorized CMTS service providers. 
 
Must submit a 5-year roll-out plan to cover at least 80% of the provincial capital 
towns/cities and 80% of the chartered cities. 
 
Must submit schedule of rates for the different types of 3G services to be offered. The 
schedule of rates shall be the maximum rates that can be charged within the first 24 
months from start of commercial operations which shall not be later than 30 months from 
date of award of the 3G radio frequency bands. Other 3G services not included in the 
submitted list may be offered subject to prior approval by the Commission; 
 
Entities with applications for the assignment of the 3G radio frequency bands may form a 
consortium. A consortium formed must provide the details of all its members, including 
the details of their ownership and control structure. 
 
Applicants for the assignment of the herein allocated 3G radio frequency bands shall be 
ranked based on the track record, roll-out commitments and rates to be charged from 
consumers/subscribers/users. 
 
Determination of qualified applicants 
 
The Commission shall, not later than 90 days from the affectivity of this Circular, 
evaluate all applications for the assignment of the 3G radio frequency bands and 
determine the best qualified applicants using the criteria described above in Sec. 3.6 of 
this Circular. Within 10 days after the determination of the best qualified applicants, the 




All applicants for the assignment of 3G radio frequency bands shall post performance 
bond equivalent to PHP300M. The performance bond shall be submitted to the 




The annual spectrum user fees (SUF) for the allocated and assigned 3G radio frequency 
bands shall be: 
 
For paired 3G radio frequency bands 
 
a.  for the first 5MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 5.00 million per MHz; 
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b.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 5MHz but 
not exceeding 10MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 8.00 million per MHz; 
 
c.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 10MHz but 
not exceeding 15MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 10.00 million per MHz; 
 
d.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 15MHz, the 
SUF shall be PhP15.00 million per MHz. 
 
For unpaired 3G radio frequency bands 
 
a.  for the first 5MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 3.00 million per MHz; 
 
b.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 5MHz but 
not exceeding 10MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 6.00 million per MHz; 
 
c.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 10MHz but 
not exceeding 15MHz, the SUF shall be PhP 8.00 million per MHz; 
 
d.  for each additional 1MHz or fraction thereof in excess of the first 15MHz, the 
SUF shall be PhP12.00 million per MHz. 
 
The SUF shall be paid not later than 31 January of each year. A penalty of 25% shall be 
imposed if the amount is not paid within the prescribed period. If the SUF is not paid in 
full the 25% penalty shall be imposed on the balance. Additional 1% per month penalty 
shall be imposed on the outstanding unpaid SUF. 
 
An additional SUF of PhP2M shall be imposed on each authorized 3G network operator 
for every 100,000 additional subscribers/users in excess of the first 4 million 
subscribers/users. The number of subscribers/users to be used in he computation of the 
SUF for the current year shall be based on the number of subscribers/users reported by 
each authorized 3G network operator at the end of the immediately preceding year or one-
half (1/2) of the maximum capacity of the access codes assigned as of the immediately 
preceding year; whichever is higher. 
 
Existing duly authorized cellular mobile telephone service providers opting to upgrade 
their networks to 3G using their existing assigned radio frequencies, and qualified 
pursuant to Sec.3.2 hereof, shall pay annual SUF of PhP65M for the first 10MHz x 2 
radio frequency band plus PhP8M for each additional 1MHz x 2 of radio frequency in 
excess of the first 10MHz x 2. 
 
An additional SUF of PhP 2M shall also be imposed for every 100,000 additional 
subscribers/users in excess of the first 4 million subscribers/users. The number of 
subscribers/users to be used in the computation of the SUF for the current year shall be 
based on the number of subscribers/users reported by each authorized 3G network 
operator at the end of the immediately preceding year or one-half (1/2) of the maximum 
capacity of the access codes assigned as of the immediately preceding year; whichever is 
higher. The SUF shall be paid not later than 31 January of each year. A penalty of 25% 
shall be imposed if the amount is not paid within the prescribed period. If the SUF due is 
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not paid in full the 25% penalty shall be imposed on the balance. Additional 1% per 
month penalty shall be imposed on the outstanding unpaid S of the SUF for the current 
year shall be based on the number of subscribers/users reported by each authorized 3G 
network operator at the end of the immediately preceding year or one-half (1/2) of the 
maximum capacity of the access codes assigned as of the immediately preceding year; 
whichever is higher SUF. 
 
Obligations of the Assignees 
 
The assignees shall comply with the following obligations: 
 
a.  Within fifteen (15) days from the award of the 3G frequencies, they shall remit to the 
Commission payments for the SUF equivalent to 1/2 of the amount specified in 
Section 6 if the award is made on or before 30 June and the full amount if award is 
made after 30 June covering the year when the award is made, and thereafter, pay 
annual spectrum user fees prescribed in Sec. 6 hereof; 
 
b.  Increase the paid capital to Php400 million not later than 30 days from date of 
assignment of 3G radio frequencies (for new public telecommunications entities); 
 
c.  Begin the installation and construction of the 3G network and facilities not later than 
12 months from date of award; 
 
d.  Start commercial operation not later than 30 months from date of award; 
 
e.  Cover at least 80% of the provincial capital cities and towns and 80% of the chartered 
cities within 60 months from date of award; 
 
f.  Strictly comply with the schedule of rates submitted; 
 
g.  Strictly comply with the prescribed service performance standards; 
 
h.  Interconnect with all 3G networks, cellular mobile telephone networks, local 
exchange networks and all other public networks pursuant to existing laws, rules and 
regulations on mandatory interconnection;  
 
i.  Share its 3G network and facilities with other 3G players in areas where demand does 
not allow more than one 3G network at mutually agreed prices or at prices set by the 
Commission. Only 3G operators that have complied with their approved roll-out plans 
can share their networks and facilities subject to mutually agreed commercial terms 
and conditions; 
 
All assignees of 3G radio frequencies shall within 120 days from date of assignment of 
the 3G radio frequencies shall jointly submit to the Commission list of areas where 
sharing of networks and facilities shall be implemented including the pricing for the use 
of the networks and facilities. 
 
•  Negotiate roaming agreements with other 3G networks and existing duly 
authorized CMTS service providers. Only 3G operators that have complied with 
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their approved roll-out plans can negotiate roaming agreements among themselves 
and with existing duly authorized CMTS service providers;  
 
Where parties fail to enter into a mutual agreement within 90 days from the start of 
commercial operations of the 3G operators, the Commission shall prescribe the terms and 
conditions for roaming. The terms and conditions for roaming prescribed by the 
Commission shall only be effective for a period not exceeding 3 years. 
 
•  Submit an application for authority to install, operate and maintain local exchange 
lines or public calling stations in unserved and underserved areas pursuant to Sec. 
12 of RA7925 not later than 90 days from the assignment of the herein allocated 
3G radio frequencies; and 
 





1. 3G network operators shall at all times be updated in the payment of the annual SUF. 
Failure to settle outstanding SUF after a reasonable period of time from due date thereof, 
shall be ground for the recall of the assigned 3G radio frequency bands. 
 
2. The failure of 3G network operators to comply with any of the obligations specified in 
Section 7 hereof shall be a cause for the cancellation of their authority to provide 3G 
services, and for the recall of the assigned 3G radio frequency bands. 
 
Appendix 6: Roll out Plan of AZCN 
 
Year Cities  Municipality 
Total  90   935  
5 14  124   
4 12  129   
3 14  265   
2 28  413 
1 22  4   
Source: Consolidated Order dated 29
th December, 2005, NTC 
 
Appendix 7:  Roll out Plan of CURE 
 
Year Cities  Municipality 
Total  71 (78%) 61 (4.12%) 
1  21 (23%) 10 (0.67%) 
2  17 (14%) 42 (1.42 %) 
3  18 (62%) 15 (2.43%) 
4  15 (78%) 25 (4.12%) 
Source: Consolidated Order dated 29
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With at least 5 additional points for track record and 1 additional point for submitting a 
roll-out plan that is over and above the minimum required coverage; would qualify 
Bayntel as a 3G assignee. The last unallocated 3G band could be allocated to it.  
Bayntel should have qualified as an assignee of 3G frequency, if the additional points for 
track record and roll-out plans are properly credited in its favor 
As per NTC MC August 7, 2005 required the minimum coverage was 80% of provincial 
capital cities and 80% of chartered cities. Bayntel’s roll-out proposal covered 82% of 
provincial capital cities and 87% of chartered cities; its roll-out proposal was over and 
above the minimum required coverage. Accordingly, Bayntel should be credited with at 
least 8 points instead of only 7. 
Bayntel was entitled to be credited with 8 points instead of 7 for submitting a roll-out plan 
that exceeds the minimum required coverage 
Bayntel had a majority and controlling interest in the National Digitel Transmission 
Network (NDTN), a 10 gigabit backbone project of six Philippine telecommunications 
carriers.  
National Telecommunications Backbone 
 
Its full feature WLL System that should be considered fully upgradeable to a full 3G 
system other facilities/assets that would enable a quick 3G roll-out or 3G expansion. 
Bayntel was ahead of its schedule by 18 months in complying with the obligation of 
rolling out 300,000 LEC’s on the other hand, other CMTS operators including those now 
ranked among the top three best qualified applicants, either failed or were delayed in 
complying with their LEC roll-out obligations.  
Granting a score of four 4 points to new company applicants, for simply meeting the 
minimum required paid up capitalization was inadequate indicator of capability to operate 
and maintain a 3G network. It may even be misleading because this paid-up capital may 
have already been impaired by the initial start up expenses for building a network.  
MTI had been evaluated on commitments on prior authorizations, and Bayntel coverage 
being more extensive it should have got higher rating. 
Bayntel’s view was that its track record should be evaluated under the same parameters 
while the consolidated decision did not categorically state that track record should be 3G-
specific, the MC, stated that track record should focus particularly on 3G networks (MC 
No. August 7, 2005, Section 3, par f). On this score, its current network served as 
sufficient proof of a track record. Bayntel felt that track record of compliance with 
commitments under prior authorizations should also include local exchange (LEC) and 
Data services should be considered since no entity could boast of a 3G track record.  
Appendix 8: Submission Made by BayanTel 
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Name        Designation Company/Organization Email
1  Mr Ricky M. Capule  Assistant Vice President, Business 
Planning & Development Finance Group 
Bayan Tel Corporate Centre  rmcapule@bayantel.com.ph
2  Atty Ariel B. Tubayan  Legal & Regulatory Affairs Div  Bayan Tel Corporate Centre  abtubayan@bayantel.com.ph
3  Mr Allan U. Cotaoco  Head-Business Development Finance  Bayan Tel Corporate Centre  aucotaoco@bayantel.com.ph
4  Mr Patrick E.Belicena  Department Head - Planning & 
Engineering Network Services Division 
SMART Communications Inc.  PEBelicena@smart.com.ph
5  Mr Jorge V. Sarmmiento  Deputy Commissioner  National Telecommunications 
Commission (NTC) 
depcom2@ntc.gov.ph
6  Atty Jaime M.Fortes Jr.  Deputy Commissioner  NTC  depcom1@ntc.gov.ph
7  Mr Edgardo V. Cabarios  Director, Common Carrier Authorization 
Department 
 NTC  ccad@ntc.gov.ph
8  Mr Marle F. Rabena  Chief, Wire and Special Public Utility 
Service Division 
NTC  wspusd@ntc.gov.ph
9  Mr Philip A. Varilla  Officer-In-Charge, Telecom Policy and 
Planning Division 
Commission on Information 
Communications Technology  
philipvari@yahoo.com
10  Mr Juliana E. Sudario  Director, Policies, Research and Standards 
Office 
Commission on Information and 
Communications Technology, 
National Computer Center 
juli@ncc.gov.ph
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